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ARGUMENT 
All briefs on appeal must be adequately briefed and presented with accuracy. Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(k). A brief containing a disjointed array of facts and 
legal analysis that is little more than conclusory statements unsupported by analysis or 
authority and which fails to cite properly to the record thereby requiring the court to research 
and review the voluminous record itself to uncover the factual underpinnings of a party's 
assertions is inadequate. State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, ffi[ll-12, 108 P.3d 710. See also 
Uckerman v.Lincoln, 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978) (The Supreme Court will not consider 
any facts not properly cited to or supported by the record); Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 
UT 98, ^22, 104 P.3d 1208 ("an appropriate remedy [for failing to support legal assertions] 
is to simply disregard the unsupported assertion, and we will do so where appropriate"); 
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182,1185 (Utah App. 1987) (Court disregarded brief 
sua sponte because it was filled with emotional, immaterial, and inaccurate arguments and 
authorities which did not bear resemblance to propositions for which they were cited). 
Appellee's Brief is neither adequate nor presented with accuracy. It is a shocking 
presentation of misrepresented, mis-cited, and mis-characterized law and fact. As 
demonstrated herein below, Stevensen miscites cases as standing for certain propositions 
which they in fact do not. Stevenson repeatedly makes blanket conclusory statements cited 
as law or fact which are unsupported by its own citations to law and/or the record. A review 
of the actual citations in the record reveals egregious inaccuracies and blatant 
misrepresentations. Stevensen also fails to directly address Watts' arguments on appeal. 
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I. Appellee's First Argument 
In response to Watts' challenge of jury instructions, Appellee sets forth the following 
proposition: "In order the [sic] appeal the Trial Court's determination of which jury 
instructions to apply, appellant had a duty to this Court to transcribe those hearings in which 
jury instructions were argued" (Appellee's Brief ["SB"] at p.5), using Hatch v. Davis, 2004 
UT App 378, W6-48, 102 P.3d 774 ("the appellant shall include in the record a transcript 
of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion") as support. Because the Plaintiff in 
Hatch failed to transcribe the testimony of eleven (11) witnesses, the Court held that the 
record was incomplete and stated that "[w]here the record before us is incomplete, we are 
unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the verdict was 
supported by admissible and competent evidence." Id. at f48 (emphasis added). 
Somehow Appellee makes the leap from this language in Hatch (which was the only 
language in Hatch cited by Stevensen) requiring an Appellant to adequately marshal the 
evidence (i.e., 11 witnesses' testimony) for a challenged factualfinding (i.e., jury verdict) to 
the proposition that an Appellant is required to transcribe jury instruction hearings for a 
challenged jury instruction, a purely legal question. Hatch stands for no such proposition! 
Stevensen next puts forth another incorrect "principal" that "[t]he evidence must even 
be marshaled where the primary focus of appellant's challenge is a legal issue." SB at p.6. 
To support its theory that challenging a jury instruction requires marshaling of the evidence, 
Stevensen cites Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177, and In re Estate of Beeslev, 
883 p.2d 1343 (Utah 1994). Chen and Beesley do not in fact support Stevensen's proposition 
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but in reality establish three types of appellate review: 
In order to establish that a particularfinding of fact is clearly erroneous, 
an appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trail court's findings are so lacking 
in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. If the evidence is 
inadequately marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are adequately 
supported by the evidence. On the other hand, whether the trial court applied 
the proper legal standard is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
The application of a legal standard, once articulated, is a slightly 
different issue, one which involves varying degrees of discretion depending on 
the standard in question. ... Even where the defendants purport to challenge 
only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of a court's application of a 
legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to 
marshal the evidence. 
Chen, 2004 UT at ^ f19"20 (citations omitted)(emphasis added); see also Beeslev, 883 P.2d 
at 1347-48. Thus, there are (1) factual finding issues which require marshaling of evidence 
and a demonstration of clear error; (2) strictly legal standard issues which are questions of 
law reviewed for correctness; and (3) issues of application of a legal standard to fact, with 
a level of deference to the trial court depending upon the level of fact sensitivity (and thus 
requiring marshaling of evidence for highly fact-sensitive applications). 
Notwithstanding Stevensen's misleading citation of only the last sentence of the 
above-cited passage, his citation refers to the court's application of a legal standard. The 
jury instructions challenged by Appellant are not applications of a legal standard but legal 
standards themselves. To be sure, "[wjhether the trial court properly instructed the jury is 
a question of law. We, therefore, review the trial court's instructions for correctness only, 
giving them no particular deference." Knapstad v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2. 
Contrary to Stevensen's representation, Watts was not required to provide hearing transcripts 
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or marshal evidence with respect to its appeal of jury instructions.1 Because Stevensen has 
completely misrepresented the law to this Court, its nonsensical first argument should be 
wholly disregarded. Stevensen also attempts to apply its erroneous legal-questions-require-
evidence-marshaling proposition to Watts' other legal questions on appeal. 
II. Appellee's Second Argument 
In response to the issue of whether Jury Instruction No. 51 (standard of care required 
of a limited liability company manager) was proper, Stevensen asserts that (1) it was based 
upon the "very balanced" MUJI 7.30 and (2) the instruction was mitigated by the charge that 
Watts be compared against a professional of ordinary and not extraordinary skill and 
caution. SB at p.9. MUJI 7.30 is titled "Standard of Care for Design Professionals". Any 
liability of Watts is derived from his conduct as a Manager of The Club Condominiums LLC, 
not as a design professional. Thus, it does not matter how balanced Stevensen alleges the 
instruction to be, it was the wrong instruction for this case. Jury Instruction No. 51 states: 
The standard of care which a Defendant manager, who is also a builder and a 
real estate developer, must exercise is that amount of skill and learning 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the defendant's profession 
practicing in the same or similar community and under similar circumstances. 
Notwithstanding Stevensen's blatant misrepresentation to the contrary, Watts' Brief 
did cite law demonstrating the error of the instruction. Appellant's Brief ("WB") at pp.9-10. 
As stated therein, limited liability company law applies to managers the gross-negligence and 
willful-misconduct standard of corporate law, from which the characteristics of an LLC 
1
 Watts provided the Court with a Final and Complete Set of Jury Instructions in 
the Addendum to Brief of Appellant Russell K. Watts. 
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originated. Id. Nowhere in corporate law, and consequently LLC law, is there a requirement 
that a director/officer/manager be charged with the duty of a design or other professional, and 
Stevensen has failed to show otherwise. The standard that applies to Watts as manager of an 
LLC is the ordinary-prudent-person standard and not the design or other professional 
standard.2 There is no justification under Utah law for Jury Instruction No. 51 as given. 
Notwithstanding the clear error of Jury Instruction No. 51, Stevensen argues without 
supporting citations that "The jury instruction did not influence the jury into thinking Watts 
was to be held to some level of conduct higher than 'the ordinary, reasonable and prudent 
man under the circumstances'." SB at p.9. First, it is unclear how Stevensen is able to know 
the mind of the jury. Secondly, the basis for such a conclusion is also a mystery. The jury's 
very mandate was to hold Watts to some level of conduct higher than the ordinary, 
reasonable prudent man. The jury was instructed to hold Watts to the skill and learning 
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the defendant's profession. It is highly 
probable that the instruction influenced the outcome as it is unreasonable to suggest that the 
jury did not hold Watts to the standard they were instructed to. Again, Stevensen provides 
no evidence for his blanket assertion to the contrary. 
Stevensen asserts that the outcome would be no different even with a proper 
instruction because 
2
 Under Utah corporate law, officers and directors are to discharge their duties 
"with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-840(l) 
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Even if the amendment suggested by appellant were made, jury instruction no. 
36 already instructed the jury that the standard of care in this case was based on 
the learning, skill and care of builders and developers. [R. 8156.] Appellant 
made no objection to jury instruction no. 36 at trial... 
Stevensen's representation to the Court is absolutely untrue. Watts did in fact object to Jury 
Instruction No. 36 at trial. R.8591, p. 1498, 1. 13-14. The trial court permitted both Jury 
Instructions No. 36 & 51 in spite of Watts' objections. Stevensen again argues a theory and 
supports it with false information. Stevensen's argument, however, succeeds in 
demonstrating the pervasiveness of this erroneous standard in the jury instructions. 
Stevensen further asserts that the jury would have considered testimony regarding 
Watts' experience anyway. First, Stevensen erroneously equates consideration of experience 
to a standard of performance', the two are not the same. Secondly, this argument is 
nonsensical as the very purpose of jury instructions is to provide the jury accurate statements 
of the law as they determine the facts and issues according to that law. 
Watts' burden, met above, is simply to show a reasonable likelihoodthat the outcome 
would be different but for the Jury Instruction No. 51 fHaupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT App 436, 
^{38,131 P.3d252) andnotto marshal evidence, as Stevensen's asserts. See above. Evidence 
of ordinary, prudent conduct will never overcome the heavy requirements of professional 
standards. Watts' issue with Jury Instruction No. 51 is not frivolous but well-grounded in 
fact and warranted by existing law. 
III. Appellee's Third Argument 
Stevensen asserts that Jury Instruction No. 53 regarding damages is an accurate 
instruction. Again, the sole support Stevensen gives to this assertion is that it "is based on 
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MUJI 19.16". Watts has never disputed that Jury Instruction No. 53 is based on MUJI 19.16, 
which is titled Damages. Watts argues that Jury Instruction No. 53, no matter its origin, is 
an erroneous instruction under Utah law for "net profit" damages. 
Under Utah law, net profits, unlike other damages, must be proven with reasonable 
certainty and, at a minimum, based upon objective facts, figures or data. WB at pp.9-12. 
Furthermore, proof of loss of gross income and expectation testimony are insufficient for 
proof of amount of damages. Id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the trial court permitted 
the following paragraph which concludes Jury Instruction No. 53 (emphasis added): 
You are permitted to determine the amount of damages by estimation or 
approximation, so long as there is a reasonable basis for such estimate or 
approximation. You may use any formula or theory for determining damages 
which is based upon the evidence of the case and which you believe to be 
reasonable; you are not bound to reject a formula or theory simply because it 
does not measure damages to the exact dollar and cent. 
Jury Instruction No. 53 conflicts with Utah law governing net profit damages because the 
jury cannot use any formula or theory but must use objective facts and data in order to 
identify lost net profits with reasonable certainty. Therefore, the instruction is erroneous. 
Stevensen alleges that "appellant failed to proffer the proposed instruction at the 
appropriate time as ordered by the Trial Court. Appellant's proposed jury instructions simply 
did not include a requested instruction on the calculation of net profits." SB at pp.11-12. 
Stevensen's representation to the Court is again absolutely untrue and contrary to the record. 
Watts did in fact request a net profits instruction consistent with Utah law. See 
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R.8591, pp.1422, 1497-99, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A".3 
Stevensen then makes the nonsensical statement that "appellant has done nothing to 
demonstrate to this Court that there was actually a need for such an instruction in this case." 
SB at p. 14. Stevensen's entire case is premised upon the argument that but for the alleged 
gross negligence or willful misconduct of Watts, Stevensen would have made a profit. See 
SB at pp. 36-37. Juries can only award damages based upon profits within narrow 
parameters, as set forth in the case law above. Therefore, it is a mystery why Stevensen 
argues that there was no need for an instruction based upon those legal parameters. 
Stevensen alleges that the outcome would not have been different even with a proper 
instruction because "the parties presented identical evidence of gross income and expenses, 
and most of the financial data from appellant's expert was even stipulated to by Stevensen's 
expert simply for purposes of clarity for the sake of the jury." SB at p. 12. This, again, is a 
misrepresentation of the record. Watts' expert, Deane Smith, presented the actual accounting 
figures for the project to which Stevensen stipulated. WB at p.7, 52; Ex.796 A.D-12. 
Stevensen's experts used Dean Smith's accounting as a beginning point to present their 
testimony (i.e., the gross income and expenses to which Stevensen refers above). 
Stevensen's experts even relied on the final gross income figures in Dean Smith's 
accounting, while at the same time decrying the costs incurred as negligence on Watts' part, 
3
 Stevensen asked the trial court for the "appropriate time" to record objections to 
the jury instructions, to which the Court responded "after they [the jury] go out." R.8591, 
p.1422,1.11-14 (Exhibit "B"). Both parties recorded their objections at that time. 
R.8591, pp.1497-1499 (Exhibit "A"). 
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apparently assuming that the gross profit for the project was not a function of such costs. 
Stevensen further states, again without support, that "Both parties assumed that the 
gross profit would have been identical to the actual amount of gross profit that actually 
accrued." SB at p. 12. The falsity of this statement is evidenced by the fact that the parties 
(Watts & Stevensen) decided to make the project more competitive in the marketplace by 
making it nicer (hence, some of the infamous design changes). No rational person would 
have expended more to make the project nicer if such person expected gross revenues from 
sales to be the same without such expenditures. Furthermore, Appellee's argument ignores 
that in the marketplace, prospective buyers would not purchase lesser quality units for the 
same price as upgraded units. Stevensen's argument that both parties assumed the same 
gross profits in either case is ludicrous. Even Stevensen's experts presented no testimony 
that there were ready, willing, and able buyers for units at any price prior to the design 
changes and increased marketing. In fact, while Stevensen's experts decried the costs, they 
could not identify any which were unnecessary. See WB, Section 4.3, pp. 44-55. Teuscher 
left it to the jury to decide that. R. 8587, p. 589,1. 15-25, p. 590,1. 1-24. Thus, the lay jury 
was left, yea even instructed, to use any formula or theory for determining damages, when 
Stevensen's experts did not and could not do so. It is not only reasonably likely but clear that 
the Jury Instruction No. 53 led to the erroneous Verdict.4 
4
 Stevensen also asserts that Watts has failed to marshal evidence with respect to 
the correctness of Jury Instruction No. 53. As with Stevensen's prior argument, since he 
has misrepresented the Appellant's Brief and the existing law, these arguments should be 
disregarded (Carrier). 
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IV. Appellee's Fourth Argument 
In response to Appellant's argument that Mr. Larsen, a construction expert, should not 
have been permitted to testify regarding industry standards that the parties contracted around, 
Stevensen has alleged that "At trial appellant stated only a general objection to permitting 
Mr. Larsen to testify at all, which was overruled, and failed to make objection to the specific 
questions or responses necessary to preserve the present issue for appeal." SB at p. 15. First, 
Stevensen fails to cite any authority that a general objection is sufficient. Secondly, it has 
again completely misrepresented the record. Watts did in fact object to specific questions 
and responses. See R.8584, p.76, 86, & 538. More importantly, Watts objected in advance 
to Mr. Larsen's anticipated testimony. R.8584, p.76,1.2-13. 
Stevensen" brief treatise on relevance does nothing to cure the erroneous admission 
of the Mr. Larsen's testimony. Construction industry standards do not apply when 
agreements between the parties are contrary to those standards. Such is the case here. For 
example, Watts was not only the Manager of the The Club, but an owner. He was not an 
inexperienced absentee owner who required an architect to keep the project running. 
Pursuant to the terms of the operating agreement, Watts was charged with keeping the project 
moving forward (which was consistent with his own best interest as an owner). Thus, 
Larsen's testimony that Watts did not comply with industry standards by requiring an 
architect to oversee construction and report to him (the manager & owner) contradicted the 
circumstances, was completely irrelevant, was in fact specifically objected to (R.8584, p.86), 
and succeeded in introducing improper prejudice against Watts to the jury. Likewise, 
SE \JLM\Watts Repl> Brief v 3 vvpd 10 
because the parties agreed otherwise, Larsen's testimony that generally design changes do 
not occur during the course of construction (contrary to the experience of many builders) and 
that cost plus contracts are not allowed in some jurisdictions is irrelevant and misleading. 
Notwithstanding Watts' specific objection to the contrary, Kesler was permitted to 
opine that Watts' failed to comport with banking industry standards. R.8586, p.538,1.14-18. 
For example, he opined that Watts was not in keeping with banking industry standards or 
forthright with the bank when he borrowed less money than necessary to complete the 
project. This might have been relevant had the Bank of Arizona been a party to this 
litigation. The Bank, however, was not a party, and Kesler's testimony was irrelevant. 
Furthermore, Watts and Stevensen both agreed to the fund-as-you-sell strategy and the terms 
of the construction loan, so both were equally responsible therefor. Exs. 10,22 & 50 (A.D-2, 
5, & 6). In addition, both Watts and Mr. Stevensen borrowed additional funds from private 
parties which permitted completion of the project. Exs.564 & 566-568 (A.D-8 & 9). 
Stevensen alleges that such industry testimony was "inconsequential" SB at p. 14. 
However, it is quite telling that Stevensen cites no less than 16 statements of industry 
testimony of its experts from pages 26 through 31 as evidence that Watts breached his duty 
of care, and thus to support the verdict. It is apparent that even Stevensen does not believe 
the testimony was inconsequential. 
Finally, Stevensen continues his marshaling tirade against Watts and alleges, without 
authority, that Watts should have provided hearing transcripts on "relevant motions in 
limine". SB at p. 15. However, Watts has provided the following relevant information for the 
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court to consider this issue: (1) the standard of review (WB, pp.13-14); (2) the agreement of 
the parties (WB, pp. 14-18); (3) record citations of Watts' objections for preservation of the 
issue on appeal (WB, p.2); and (4) record citations of the Court's ruling on Watts' objection 
(WB, pp.14 & 16). Stevensen has presented no authority or support for his assertion that 
more than this is required, therefore his argument should be disregarded (Carrier). 
V. Appellee's Fifth Argument 
In his Fifth Argument, Stevensen alleges that "appellants [sic] have failed to marshal 
even a fraction of the evidence and have failed to present the evidence to this Court in the 
manner required for an appeal", calling Watts' effort a "meager job" and calling the weight 
of the evidence "overwhelming" in favor of the verdict. SB at pp.22, 25, 47. Stevensen 
further states that "Appellant fails to even come close to summarizing all of the testimony 
and exhibits upon which the jury's findings were based." SB at p.47. 
First, Stevensen mistakes Watts' duty. The requirement Watts must meet to overturn 
the jury's finding of gross negligence/willful misconduct and a damage award of $474,000 
is to marshal all of the evidence that might possibly support the Verdict and then expose the 
fatal flaw. Interiors Contracting, Inc.v. Hollander & Smith Assocs., 881 P.2d 929,933 (Utah 
App. 1994). Watts need only marshal the evidence that might support the verdict; he is not 
in a position to know all of the testimony and exhibits upon which the jury's findings were 
based. The Utah Supreme Court, in discussing the "difficulties inherent in attempting to 
point out specifically wherein there is 4no evidence' to support a given finding" has stated 
that 
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An appellant cannot be asked to go through the transcript, showing how the 
testimony reported on each page does no support the finding. Yet, insofar as 
is practicable, he must detail, with citation to the record where appropriate, the 
particulars wherein the evidence touching the finding is inconsistent therewith 
or is not of enough moment to sustain it. 
In re Lavelle's Estate,248 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1952). Watts has met his duty and, as 
explained below, Stevensen has done nothing to show the contrary. Its colorful adjectives and 
inflammatory characterizations notwithstanding, Stevensen has failed to point out where 
Watts has failed to marshal relevant evidence. 
A. Where's the evidence of negligence, let alone gross negligence? 
The "evidence" which Stevensen has compiled to show the alleged "shortcoming" of 
Watts' marshaling is comprised of and can be broken down as follows: 
Statement Type within Stevensen's Brief Location in Watts' Brief 
79 Statements of Argument/Speculation 
52 Misrepresentations/mis-citations/mis-characterizations 
18 references to Budget changes/going over budget pp. 25-26 
16 references to Industry Standards testimony pp.20-28, 30 
16 references to Watts' failure to inform/obtain consent from Stevensen pp.. 18-19 
12 references to design changes pp.22-24 
11 references to delays beyond construction contract provisions pp.21-22, 25-29 
9 references to Watts' dealings with the Bank of Arizona pp.21, 25-26 
9 references to accounting testimony pp. 25-26, 28-30 
6 references to The Club's payment of fees/commissions to Watts Corp. p.26 
5 references to the 1% commission owed to Stevensen p 29 
5 references to marketing costs p.30(&p.55) 
3 references to interest payed by The Club pp. 6-7, 17, 20, 28 
3 references to running out of money pp.21, 25-29 
3 references to double booking p.30 
2 references to Watts' knowledge or lack thereof pp.19, 21 
2 references to the Appraisal pp. 19-20 
1 reference to the architects lack of involvement pp.24-25 
1 reference to the Jury Verdict award 
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Stevensen presents no actual evidence that Watts has not already substantially cited, as noted 
above. Particularly troubling are Stevensen's misrepresentation, mis-citations, and mis-
characterizations which are too numerous to set forth sentence by sentence.5 
Stevensen makes 79 statements of theory, argument and/or speculation followed by 
a citation to the record, which citation merely references some tangential fact from which 
Stevensen springboards into his theories, arguments and/or speculation. To be sure, the 
record citation does not in most instances stand for the alleged proposition.6 
Stevensen's 41 references to budget changes, design changes, and delays, while amply 
cited in Watts' Brief, cannot support the Verdict. The Jury found that The Club did not 
breach Section 4.1 of the Operating Agreement "which requires an agreement in writing 
signed by [Stevensen] and [R.K. W.96 - Watts] to change the scope, nature and budget of the 
Club Condominium Project...". Jury Verdict, Question 1 (A.C-5). Because the Jury found 
that The Club (and thus Watts) did not breach the contractual arrangement between himself 
and Stevensen for making changes to the scope, nature, and budget of The Club with or 
without Stevensen's authorization, it could not have based its finding of negligence or its 
award on such changes. WB at pp.31-32. In rebuttal, Stevensen makes only a disjointed 
5
 Eg., "The parties agreed that Watts would ultimately receive a single fee for the 
construction, consisting of the 8% payment to Watts Corporation for building the 
condominiums." SB at p.39, ^3. Compare Ex. D-l, §§4.1 & 6.1 (Operating Agreement: 
10% Dev. Fee to RKW 96) & Ex. D-2, §5.1 (Construction Contract: 8% Contractor Fee 
to Watts Corp.). 
6
 Eg., "Given the fact that construction was not on track to be completed on time, 
design changes that would increase the budget and delay construction after October 1998 
were no longer justified or even prudent/' SB at p. 35, ^|1. [citing R.8590, pp.1324-25]. 
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statement that "Breach of fiduciary duty is a tort." SB at p.47. While true, Watts' point is 
that since the jury found that Watts had acted within the confines of Section 4.1 of the 
parties' agreement respecting budget/design changes, it would be illogical and legally 
impossible for the jury to find that he committed a "tort" by the same conduct. Stevensen 
misses the point and fails to refute it. Furthermore, Watts, as manager, may rely on experts 
when making company decisions and be protected from liability (see WB at pp. 41-42), 
which Stevensen does not refute. 
The 16 references to industry standards set out by Stevensen are irrelevant, prejudicial 
information, as established above, that cannot support the verdict without first voiding the 
parties' agreements and contracts. Likewise, Stevensen's expert's complaints regarding a 
lack of architect supervision is irrelevant. The architect would have reported to Watts, who 
was already personally supervising and managing the project. This arrangement would not 
have benefitted the project. To Watts' irrelevance arguments (WB at pp. 13-18, 35-41), 
Stevensen retorts "Appellant grossly misstates the basis for Larsen's opinions", but fails to 
explain and even argue the appropriateness of his testimony. It merely states that Dazley was 
"kept in the dark" (without citation to the record) and recites non-testimony "evidence" in 
support of the verdict but does not otherwise defend the testimony. SB at pp.48-49. 
Stevensen's admission that Dazley's involvement or lack thereof in the project provides the 
"basis" for Larsen's testimony establishes the irrelevance of the testimony to the verdict, the 
testimony being based upon a faulty premise (that the Architect must report to Watts 
regarding the work that Watts performed), which Stevensen asserts is the basis for liability. 
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Stevensen's 16 references to Watts' alleged failure to inform/obtain consent from 
Stevensen is contrary to the record and contrary to the verdict.7 Furthermore, the jury would 
have had to ignore all of the documents Mr. Stevensen signed, all the documents sent to Mr. 
Stevensen, and all of the meetings that Mr. Stevensen attended. See WB at p.34. 
Furthermore, Watts did not have a duty to keep Stevensen informed. Watts duty as manager 
is defined by statute. See WB at p.32-33. In rebuttal, Stevensen again misses the point by 
making a disjointed statement that Watts Corp kept the records. SB at pp.47-48. No matter 
where the records were kept, although Mr. Stevensen had a right to inspect them, he never 
requested them until after he was advised a loss was imminent. Watts could not force Mr. 
Stevensen to request, read or comprehend what was available, and Stevensen's defamatory 
and irrelevant statements in rebuttal do nothing to refute that. 
The Club's commission payments to the Watts Group and interest payments to Watts 
Corporation are also irrelevant. The Club was contractually bound to make such payments. 
Watts cannot be grossly negligent for satisfying The Club's contractual obligations, 
particularly when each of those contracts was agreed to and signed by Stevensen and Watts. 
See Exs.4, 10, & 50 (A.D-1, 2, & 6). Stevensen did not assert that the contracts with the 
Watts Group or Watts Corporation were not enforceable. It would have been improper and 
legally impossibly for the jury to have found negligence in Watts' adherence to them. 
7
 The jury found that The Club did not breach the Operating Agreement by failing 
to obtain Mr. Stevensen's consent to change the scope or budget of the project. R. 8188 
(A.C-5). 
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Likewise, the Club's dealings with the Bank and running-out-of-money evidence 
cannot support the Verdict. As stated above, Stevensen and Watts agreed to limit the funds 
borrowed from the Bank and to "take sales from completed closed units and take the funds, 
those additional funds and use them to finish the rest of the units." R.8586, p.389, 1.2-16; 
399,1.4-12. Watts cannot be grossly negligent for the parties' agreed-to fund-as-you-sell 
strategy any more than Stevensen can. 
Notwithstanding Stevensen's relentless assertion throughout this case that the 
accounting "may have included the double billing of the development fee" (SB at p.44), 
Stevensen provides no record citations that support such an allegation and fails to respond 
to Watts' argument (WB at p.42-44). Contrary to what Stevensen represents to the Court, 
neither Deane Smith nor Russell Watts ever suggested the possibility of a double booking.8 
Stevensen's misunderstanding of accounting principles has led him to erroneously equate an 
expense with a credit to the capital account. Both entries must be made to (1) reflect (book) 
the member's contribution (development fee in this case) in his capital account, and (2) 
recognize a company expense so that profits aren't overstated. Watts has never even actually 
8
 Stevensen refers to but does not quote the following language (R.8590, p.l 150, 
1.6-13) (emphasis added) for the proposition that Deane Smith "testified that his 
calculations may have included the double billing". 
A That would mean they put [the development fee] on the 
balance sheet. They capitalized it in 2001 and they moved it to the income 
statement in 2002. So based on that statement of development fee expenses 
in 2002, is that, is it possible that part of the $900,000 cost of sales on the 
$486,000 of units sold is just adding this development fee as an expense to 
the costs of goods soldi 
A Entirely possible. 
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received the fee from The Club, as Stevensen's expert testified. R.8587, p.587, 1.17-23. 
Furthermore, the jury found no breach with respect to the development fee credit. R. 8190 
(A.C-5). Stevensen even concedes that the verdict is not supported by a "possible double 
payment of the fee". SB at p.50. 
The corporate standard in Utah, from which the LLC standard is derived {see above), 
has been held to be the care that a prudent person would exercise over his own business or 
affairs.9 In this case, The Club was Watts' own business. Watts had a 50% stake in its 
profits. As an owner, Watts exercised the very standard of care that should be exercised. 
B. Where's the evidence of causation? 
Even assuming, for purposes of this subsection only, that Watts was of the poor 
character portrayed by Stevensen at trial and in its Brief and was in fact grossly negligent, 
Stevensen has presented no evidence that but for such gross negligence, Stevensen would 
have enjoyed additional distributions. The jury should have first been required to link any 
found misconduct of Watts to actual damages and then determine such damages from the 
evidence. The record contains no evidence of such a link. See WB pp.44-55. Stevensen's 
Brief fails to directly address causation. It merely retorts that "the jury listened to different 
witnesses for different pieces of evidence"(SB at p.50) without identifying even one piece 
9
 Warren v. Robison, 57 P. 287, 291-292 (Utah 1899) ("A corporation is 
represented by its trustees and managers; their acts are its acts, and their neglect its 
neglect. The employment of agents of good character does not discharge their whole duty. 
It is misconduct not to do this; but, in addition, they are required to exercise such 
supervision and vigilance as a discreet person would exercise over his own affairs.") 
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of causation evidence that the jury listened to. While Stevensen cries "delay, delay, delay" 
(due to the upgrades), it has failed to demonstrate that there were buyers for the original 
project without the upgrades. Rather, it engages in the invective used at trial regarding Watts' 
conduct and character.10 Since Stevensen has not directly addressed the issue, the Court 
should reject any argument for causation. 
The fact of the matter is Stevensen has not addressed this issue because it cannot. 
While bereft of evidence linking Watts to any damage, the record is replete with evidence 
of market problems (eg., R.8584, p.105; R.8585, pp. 265 & 268; R.8587, pp.670-673; 
R.8588, pp.794-795). This case is in fact a microcosm of the real estate industry today, as 
reflected in Watts' irrefuted testimony: 
Q So you could have shown people a finished unit in August, had 
a grand opening in November and if you had the grand opening in November 
you probably could have been selling units in November and December, right? 
A We don't know. That's all market driven. What's interesting in 
a lot of projects, we'll have 10 to 20 percent pre-sales even before the homes 
are completed. In this case the market wasn't doing pre-sales and we had pre-
sales on a lot of project that are ready to close the minute we're done. In this 
project we didn't have that. We'd taken hundreds of people through and the 
market was not here at that time. 
R.8586, p.410, 1.11-21. Notwithstanding the difficult market, Watts' real estate expert, 
George Richards, testified that he felt The Club made the right design decision for the Salt 
Lake City marketplace at the time. R.8588, p.812,1.7-13. 
It is important to remember that Watts was a joint owner with Stevensen and that 
10
 Eg., "steal", "embezzle", "dirty little boy". R.8591, pp. 1482-1487; SB at pp.38-
43, 47-49. 
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Watts suffered a share of damage equal to any damage suffered by Stevensen. He managed 
the entire project without salary and, ultimately, without even the earned development fee. 
However, investors like Stevensen and Watts, assume such market risks. 
C. Where's the evidence of damages? 
Stevensen states that "The jury employed simple addition and subtraction to calculate 
their verdict." From what? Stevensen argues a lot of the-jury-may-have's but does not 
provide any evidence of how $474,000 could be supported through simple addition and 
subtraction. Stevensen provides no damages evidence because there is none. Deane Smith 
provided the actual accounting of operations which was not in dispute. In simple 
addition/subtraction terms, Deane Smith's accounting can be represented in the following 
equation: GP - TC = NP, where GP = the gross sum of all sales receipts for all units, TC = 
the total costs incurred in obtaining GP, and NP = Net Profit. 
Stevensen's financial expert, Mr. Teuscher, provided no evidence of what NP should 
have been. He simply took the actual GP from Deane Smith's accounting (R.8587, p.589, 
1.3-13), provided two alternative scenarios none of which was based upon any evidence of 
an improper expense, and stated: 
A ... To be a little - to simplify this a little bit, if you go to 
everything below construction cost, I would say that those are probably not 
things that would really be adjustable on this schedule. The thing that would 
really have to be looked at to make that type of a determination would be the 
construction costs and the decision on those costs would be whether the costs 
that Stevensen actually approved for the project to go forward with is the 
number that the project should be measured by or whether Stevensen should 
be included in the responsibility for costs that happened after that approved 
time which would be the difference between these two which is roughly $1 
million. 
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R.8587, pp. 589-590 (emphasis added). In other words, Stevensen's expert opined that the 
jury could reach the lost net profits figure by adjusting only TC (by subtracting the costs that 
Stevensen did not approve of). 
First of all, the jury found that there was no breach of the Operating Agreement for 
changes in the budget; consequently, Stevensen is deemed to have approved of all of the 
project costs. R. 8188 (A.C-5). Secondly, Teuscher apparently assumed that GP was static 
and not a function of costs expended (i.e., GP remains the same [same number of buyers 
paying the same price] regardless of marketing and upgrade expenditures)—clearly a faulty 
assumption not reflected in reality or in the evidence (i.e., buyers did not appear until 
upgrades were made). Finally and most importantly, Teuscher could make no determination 
as to what those costs might be or what costs were not necessary.11 He even said regarding 
"unsupported costs", "I'm not sure quite frankly how a jury could make a decision on 
whether those are appropriate or not." R.8587, p.590,1.22-24. 
Stevensen's construction expert, Mr. Larsen, likewise could not identify even one 
unnecessary cost. R.8584, p. 112,1. 8-11; 128,1.14-24. He simply testified that delay equals 
cost and that The Club could have completed the project on time if not for the design changes 
(R.8584, p.l 12,1.8-11; 128,1.14-24) notwithstanding his admission that "I've not done an 
independent time analysis." Id. To be sure, no expert for either side could identify let alone 
11
 R. 8587, p. 588,1.19-23: 
A I'm not advocating either scenario. I'm just saying that there 
are two ways to measure this depending on the facts that the Court 
determines. I can't determine those facts, so based on which side it ends up 
on, these are the two looks at what the bottom line would be. 
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quantify any lost profit damages to Stevensen. See WB at pp. 44-55. Thus, the lay jury was 
left to identify and quantify with reasonable certainty the very unnecessary costs that 
Stevensen's own experts could not. Unless the jury had a hidden construction expertise, it 
is enigmatic how they arrived at their damage award (what formula or theory they used). 
VI. Appellee's Sixth Argument 
In support of its award of prejudgment interest, Stevensen cites Smith v. Fairfax, 2003 
UT 41, 82 P.3d 1064. Smith is very instructive regarding when prejudgment interest is 
appropriate. However, Stevensen's commentary thereon, especially his extensive fiduciary 
commentary, is misleading. First, the type of damages awarded in Smith are significantly 
different. Smith involves the jury's valuation of the "fair market value of Smiths' partnership 
interest in the [partnership's sole] mall property at the time of transfer" (Id. at ^ [10, emphasis 
added), whereas this action involves the jury's calculation of lost net profits. Utah has 
established very narrow parameters for the latter. See Section III, above. 
More importantly, the Smith court limited its discussion of prejudgment interest vis-a-
vis a fiduciary to the following: 
Some jurisdictions apply the rule that a fiduciary who breaches his duties 
should not be allowed to benefit from his misconduct and therefore must 
account for interest on any money or property the fiduciary misappropriated. 
[The court recites trial court's application of the foregoing rule.] This court has 
never decided whether to adopt the principle that prejudgment interest is 
always appropriate in breach of fiduciary cases. 
Id. at Tfljl 8-19 (emphasis added). The Smith court, however, did not resolve the issue under 
a fiduciary scenario but under Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 (Utah 1907), the 
foundational case for Watts' prejudgment-interest appeal. See WB at pp.55-59. Thus, as 
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evidenced by Stevensen's own case, Fell is still the applicable standard: 
... we deny awards of prejudgment interest in cases where damage amounts are 
to be determined by the broad discretion of the jury. "In all personal injury 
cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel, slander, false imprisonment... and 
all cases where the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within the 
province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial, no interest is permissible" 
Smith, 2003 UT at 1J20 (citing Fell, 88 P. at 1006) (emphasis added). 
Stevensen argues that 'The jury was given only the limited decision to determine 
which specific items of expenses were unjustified under the circumstances." SB at p.53. Not 
only does this statement prove that this was a lost net profits calculation case and not a 
property valuation case, it also proves that the damages were incomplete and particularly 
within the province of the jury to assess (Smith; Fell). Stevensen's own experts could not 
identify, let alone quantify, any items of expenses that were unjustified. See Section V.B, 
above. Fell does not permit prejudgment interest in this case. 
VII. Appellee's Seventh Argument 
In his rebuttal to Watts' argument against attorneys' fees, Stevensen asserts that it has 
provided "a very detailed breakdown of the attorneys fees requested". SB at p.61. As detailed 
as counsel's affidavits may be in his own mind, they do not satisfy the clear requirements of 
Utah law, which requirements Stevensen ignores in his rebuttal. Utah law requires that 
... the party [seeking attorneys fees] must categorize the time and fees 
expended for c(l) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an 
entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for 
which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.' [citing Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine. 830 P.2d 266, 269-270 (Utah 1992)] [Additional reference omitted] 
Claims must also be categorized according to the various opposing parties. 
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Foote v. Clark. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). Stevensen's attorneys' fees affidavits (A.C-7 
& 8) do not satisfy these requirements and thus cannot support the trial judge's award of 
attorneys' fees. The deficiencies of the affidavits are discussed in Watts' Brief at pp. 60-63. 
VIII. Appellee's Eighth Argument 
Stevensen concedes that witness fees beyond the statutory limit, copy expenses, and 
service of process fees awarded by the trial court are not taxable costs permitted by Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d), as interpreted by Utah case law. SB at p.65. However, it 
argues that such costs are still awardable as consequential damages. Stevensen fails to 
acknowledge the following language in Morgan (a case it cites to support its argument): 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) governs the cost awards in civil 
litigation [cites Rule 54(d)(1)]. The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs to 
mean "those fees which are required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, 
and for which the statutes authorize to be included in the judgment." [citing 
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774]. 
Id. at 686. The court did not say that Rule 54(d)(1) governs cost awards unless they are a 
foreseeable consequence. While the trial judge may award costs within Rule 54(d) and 
interpreting case law, he did not have discretion to award costs beyond the scope thereof. 
Since the trial judge exceeded his discretion, the award must be reversed. Stevensen again 
concludes by misrepresenting a marshaling requirement for determinations of legal standards. 
IX. Appellee's Ninth Argument 
Stevensen asserts that Watts' Brief is frivolous, yet it has filled 70 pages of a brief 
without directly addressing nearly all of Watts' arguments, points, and authorities. Since 
Stevensen does not understand and/or could not rebut the issues on appeal, its relentless 
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allegations of this appeal's frivolousness should be immediately discredited or if considered, 
considered only as to Stevensen's presentation. 
CONCLUSION 
Stevensen's primary complaint is that Watts increased the budget to pad his own 
pockets at Stevensen's expense. The complaint is based on a faulty assumption—that Watts' 
pockets were padded. Watts was to receive (1) 8% of the construction costs by virtue of his 
interest in Watts Corp., the contractor, and (2) a 10% development fee. The jury found that 
there was no breach of the operating agreement for the changes in budget costs or for 
booking the development fee. R.8188, 8190. 
Rather than lecturing on "advocacy", Stevensen should have focused on the issues and 
arguments, read its cases, and presented an accurate record to the Court. Though a jury was 
clearly persuaded by Stevensen's invective and defamatory characterizations of Watts, the 
Court will no doubt find that there is no substance in the record to support the verdict or 
counsel's slanderous characterizations and arguments, which should be disregarded. 
Dated this *2f*> day of November, 2( 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
POOLE & ASSOCIATES, L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant Russell K. Watts 
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EXHIBIT "A 
1 (Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
2 THE COURT: Okay, be seated, please. We'll take 
3 that break and we'll come back and start with you, Mr. 
4 Roundy, and I'm looking at like 1:30 probably before we're 
5 going to be breaking for lunch. So the food will be sitting 
6 around at the jury. We've ordered some lunch for them, and 
7 I'm always against that, frankly. Because it just means 
8 they're going to eat and we wait, but it'll give you a chance 
9 to eat to, I guess. So... But okay. So anything we need to 
10 bring up at all at this point? 
11 MR. ROUNDY: Do you want to make a record as to any 
12 objection on the jury instructions right now, or save that? 
13 THE COURT: You can make your record after they go 
14 out. 
15 MR. ROUNDY: Okay. 
16 THE COURT: If there's something that you think I 
17 should correct that, you know, that we haven't discussed, or 
18 you think is just plainly wrong, you can - we can raise that 
19 now if you'd like to. 
20 MR. ROUNDY: I think we've discussed everything. 
21 It's just a matter of making the record. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. You can do it when they've 
23 gone out. 
2 4 MR. ROUNDY: Okay. 
25 THE COURT: You'll have plenty of time. 
1422 
1 MR. POOLE: I thought they might be objecting to 
2 lunch or something. 
3 THE COURT: So, okay. Well, I think we're now in a 
4 hold mode now, I think, as long as Melba has your phone 
5 numbers, which I think she does. She's nodding her head. 
6 We're okay. So if you have any questions of the Court, or 
7 the clerks, or anything, feel free to get a hold of us. 
8 MR. POOLE: Do you want us to just put those 
9 objections on the record now relative to the instructions? 
10 THE COURT: Yeah. You can use this time to do 
11 that, 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
MR. POOLE 
THE COURT 
MR. POOLE 
MS. EVANS 
All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 
Okay. Thank you. 
Liz? 
Go ahead. Go ahead and go first. 
MR. ROUNDY: All right. The first thing I'll just 
put on the record is that we've asked the Court about 
necessity of a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to 
the evidence. The Court indicated that wasn't necessary, but 
we just wanted to have that on the record that we had 
requested that to the extent that the Court decides it's 
necessary. 
As far as objections to the jury instructions go, 
we have two instructions - or two objections to put on the 
25 record. The first is our position - plaintiff's position 
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that the gross negligence, willfulness conduct standard 
that's being applied to many of the jury instructions is the 
incorrect standard in the case and those should be removed, 
and the correct standard stated. 
And the second is, it's our belief that the burden 
of proof in this case with regard to several of the matters 
is on Russell Watts as the manager of The Club, and 
particularly with regard to matters where there's evidence of 
self dealing we believe that the burden shifts to the manger, 
and so those are instructions that have been requested in the 
record but that were not given in this case. 
MS. EVANS: Elizabeth Evans for defendants, RKW 96 
and Russell Watts. We object to the Court's jury instruction 
number 36, evidence regarding standard of care. And jury 
instruction 51, also with respect to the standard of care, 
and anywhere else in the jury instructions where the standard 
of care is reflected that. It should be with respect to a 
builder and real estate developer in the community. We do 
not believe that the Limited Liability Company Act qualifies 
the standard of care in such a way and that the manager of a 
limited liability company is only subject to the standard of 
care with respect to gross negligence or willful misconduct, 
or under subsection (c), the higher degree that may exist in 
the parties' agreements which the Court has agreed and 
instructed the jury that there is no higher standard. 
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1 We also object to the damages instructions to the 
2 extent that we had requested an instruction regarding net 
3 profits and the Court has denied that instruction. The 
4 instruction that we proffered was as follows. "You are 
5 instructed that if a plaintiff meets its burden of proof for 
6 liability and proximate cause, it must then prove its 
7 damages. Stevensen 3rd East is seeking an award of lost 
8 profits. You are instructed that a plaintiff seeking an 
9 award of lost profits is not entitled to an award of gross 
10 profits, but rather only an award for net profits if it meets 
11 its burden of proving damages. A plaintiff seeking an award 
12 of net profits must prove not only the gross profits, but it 
13 must also must present evidence of overhead expenses or other 
14 costs that would be necessarily incurred in order to produce 
15 that income. Furthermore, any opinion expressed with respect 
16 to a lost profit figure must be based on objective facts, 
17 figures, or data." That proposed instruction was based on 
18 Carlson Distributing Company v. Salt Lake Brewing Company, 
19 L.C., (Utah App. 2004) 227, the P.3d cite is 95 P.3d 1171. 
2 0 And Killpatrick v. Wiley, Rhine, and Fielding (Utah App. 
21 2001) 107, and the P.3d cite is 37 P.3d 1130. 
22 MR. BLAKESLEY: Jim Blakesley appearing on behalf 
23 of The Club Condominium, LC. I would join in the objections 
24 stated by Liz Evans. 
25 MR. POOLE: I guess, we've nothing further? 
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